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dc.contributor.authorHeller, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-19T15:07:49Z
dc.date.available2020-02-19T15:07:49Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2384/583088
dc.description.abstractLaw resists theorems. We have hypotheses, typologies, heuristics, and conundrums. But, until now, only one plausible theorem - and that we borrowed from economics. Could there be a second, the Rose Theorem? Any theorem must generalize, be falsifiable, and have predictive power. Law's theorems, however, seem to require three additional qualities: they emerge from tales of ordinary stuff; are named for, not by, their creators; and have no single authoritative form. For example, Ronald Coase wrote of ranchers and farmers. He has always shied away from the Theorem project. When later scholars formalized his parable, they created multiple and inconsistent versions. Likewise, Carol Rose writes rich narratives of maypoles and foxes, rivers and roman roads. She offers a theory of human motivation and predictions about our behavior. And we may ask, though she might not, whether the rich alluvial mud of her scholarship crystallizes into a Rose Theorem.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectHistory Commonsen_US
dc.subjectLaw Commonsen_US
dc.titleThe Rose Theorem?en_US
dc.source.volume18en_US
dc.source.issue3en_US
dc.source.numberofpages21en_US
refterms.dateFOA2020-02-19T15:07:50Z
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal of Law & the Humanitiesen_US


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